Publications

Publications in 2022

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    2022

    • Timo Häckel, Philipp Meyer, Lukas Stahlbock, Falk Langer, Sebastian A. Eckhardt, Franz Korf, and Thomas C. Schmidt. A Multilayered Security Infrastructure for Connected Vehicles — First Lessons from the Field. In: 2022 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium Workshops (IV Workshops). Piscataway, NJ, USA, May. 2022, IEEE Press,
      [Abstract], [Bibtex]

      Connected vehicles are vulnerable to manipulation and a broad attack surface can be used to intrude in-vehicle networks from anywhere on earth. In this work, we present an integrated security infrastructure comprising network protection, monitoring, incident management, and counteractions, which we built into a prototype based on a production car. Our vehicle implements a Software-Defined Networking Ethernet backbone to restrict communication routes, network anomaly detection to make misbehavior evident, virtual controller functions to enable agile countermeasures, and an automotive cloud defense center to analyse and manage incidents on vehicle fleets. We present first measurements and lessons learned from operating the prototype: many network attacks can be prevented through software-defined access control in the backbone; anomaly detection can reliably detect misbehavior but needs to improve on false positive rate; controller virtualization needs tailored frameworks to meet in-car requirements; and cloud defence enables fleet management and advanced countermeasures. Our findings indicate attack mitigation times in the vehicle from 257 ms to 328 ms and from 2,168 ms to 2,713 ms traversing the cloud.

      @InProceedings{   hmsle-msijr-22,
        author        = {Timo H\"ackel AND Philipp Meyer AND Lukas Stahlbock AND
                        Falk Langer AND Sebastian A. Eckhardt AND Franz Korf AND
                        Thomas C. Schmidt},
        title         = {{A Multilayered Security Infrastructure for Connected
                        Vehicles -- First Lessons from the Field}},
        booktitle     = {2022 {IEEE} Intelligent Vehicles Symposium Workshops ({IV}
                        Workshops)},
        month         = may,
        year          = 2022,
        publisher     = {IEEE Press},
        address       = {Piscataway, NJ, USA},
        abstract      = { Connected vehicles are vulnerable to manipulation and a
                        broad attack surface can be used to intrude in-vehicle
                        networks from anywhere on earth. In this work, we present
                        an integrated security infrastructure comprising network
                        protection, monitoring, incident management, and
                        counteractions, which we built into a prototype based on a
                        production car. Our vehicle implements a Software-Defined
                        Networking Ethernet backbone to restrict communication
                        routes, network anomaly detection to make misbehavior
                        evident, virtual controller functions to enable agile
                        countermeasures, and an automotive cloud defense center to
                        analyse and manage incidents on vehicle fleets. We present
                        first measurements and lessons learned from operating the
                        prototype: many network attacks can be prevented through
                        software-defined access control in the backbone; anomaly
                        detection can reliably detect misbehavior but needs to
                        improve on false positive rate; controller virtualization
                        needs tailored frameworks to meet in-car requirements; and
                        cloud defence enables fleet management and advanced
                        countermeasures. Our findings indicate attack mitigation
                        times in the vehicle from 257 ms to 328 ms and from 2,168
                        ms to 2,713 ms traversing the cloud. },
        groups        = {own, publications, security, sdn, anomaly-detection}
      }
    • Timo Häckel, Philipp Meyer, Franz Korf, and Thomas C. Schmidt. Secure Time-Sensitive Software-Defined Networking in Vehicles. In: . Jan. 2022,
      [Abstract], [DOI], [ArXiv], [Bibtex]

      Current designs of future In-Vehicle Networks (IVN) prepare for switched Ethernet backbones, which can host advanced LAN technologies such as IEEE Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN). In this work, we present an integrated Time-Sensitive Software-Defined Networking (TSSDN) architecture that simultaneously enables control of synchronous and asynchronous real-time and best-effort traffic for all IVN traffic classes using a central SDN controller. We validate that the control overhead of SDN can be added without a delay penalty for TSN traffic, provided protocols are properly mapped. Based on our TSSDN concept, we demonstrate adaptable and reliable network security mechanisms for in-vehicle communication. We systematically investigate different strategies for integrating in-vehicle control flows with switched Ether-networks and analyze their security implications for a software-defined IVN. We discuss embeddings of control flow identifiers on different layers, covering a range from a fully exposed mapping to deep encapsulations. We experimentally evaluate these strategies in a production vehicle which we map to a modern Ethernet topology. Our findings indicate that visibility of automotive control flows on lower network layers is essential for providing isolation and access control throughout the network infrastructure. Such a TSSDN backbone can establish and survey trust zones within the IVN and reduce the attack surface of connected cars in various attack scenarios.

      @Article{         hmks-stsdn-22,
        author        = {Timo H{\"a}ckel AND Philipp Meyer AND Franz Korf AND
                        Thomas C. Schmidt},
        title         = {{Secure Time-Sensitive Software-Defined Networking in
                        Vehicles}},
        month         = jan,
        year          = 2022,
        doi           = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2201.00589},
        eprinttype    = {arxiv},
        eprint        = {2201.00589},
        abstract      = {Current designs of future In-Vehicle Networks (IVN)
                        prepare for switched Ethernet backbones, which can host
                        advanced LAN technologies such as IEEE Time-Sensitive
                        Networking (TSN) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN). In
                        this work, we present an integrated Time-Sensitive
                        Software-Defined Networking (TSSDN) architecture that
                        simultaneously enables control of synchronous and
                        asynchronous real-time and best-effort traffic for all IVN
                        traffic classes using a central SDN controller. We validate
                        that the control overhead of SDN can be added without a
                        delay penalty for TSN traffic, provided protocols are
                        properly mapped. Based on our TSSDN concept, we demonstrate
                        adaptable and reliable network security mechanisms for
                        in-vehicle communication. We systematically investigate
                        different strategies for integrating in-vehicle control
                        flows with switched Ether-networks and analyze their
                        security implications for a software-defined IVN. We
                        discuss embeddings of control flow identifiers on different
                        layers, covering a range from a fully exposed mapping to
                        deep encapsulations. We experimentally evaluate these
                        strategies in a production vehicle which we map to a modern
                        Ethernet topology. Our findings indicate that visibility of
                        automotive control flows on lower network layers is
                        essential for providing isolation and access control
                        throughout the network infrastructure. Such a TSSDN
                        backbone can establish and survey trust zones within the
                        IVN and reduce the attack surface of connected cars in
                        various attack scenarios.},
        groups        = {own, publications, simulation, tsn, security, sdn},
        langid        = {english}
      }